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Uncertainty is an inherent property of the environ-
ment and a central feature of models of decision-
making and learning. Theoretical propositions sug-
gest that one form, unexpected uncertainty, may be
used to rapidly adapt to changes in the environment,
while being influenced by two other forms: risk and
estimation uncertainty. While previous studies have
reported neural representations of estimation uncer-
tainty and risk, relatively little is known about unex-
pected uncertainty. Here, participants performed
a decision-making task while undergoing functional
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), which, in com-
bination with a Bayesian model-based analysis,
enabled us to separately examine each form of un-
certainty examined. We found representations of un-
expected uncertainty in multiple cortical areas, as
well as the noradrenergic brainstem nucleus locus
coeruleus. Other unique cortical regions were found
to encode risk, estimation uncertainty, and learning
rate. Collectively, these findings support theoretical
models in which several formally separable uncer-
tainty computations determine the speed of learning.
INTRODUCTION
In both our physical and social environments, we frequently
encounter demanding situations in which optimal performance
depends on our ability to maintain accurate internal representa-
tions of the statistics of those unstable environments. This is a
complex task because samples from an unstable environment
may vary in their relevance for predicting future outcomes. For
example, if the statistics underlying the environment have
changed, then recently acquired samples are more representa-
tive of the new environment than old samples and should be
weighted accordingly. It has been emphasized (Behrens et al.,
2007; Yu and Dayan, 2005) that uncertainty may be used to
the advantage of learners, allowing them to optimally weigh
new data against old when updating their beliefs. One approach,which could be regarded as a formof novelty detection, suggests
that learners quantify at each time point the likelihood that the
statistics underlying the environment have changed based on
the current sample (Nassar et al., 2010; Payzan-LeNestour and
Bossaerts, 2011; Yu and Dayan, 2005). This quantity, termed
unexpected uncertainty, can be used to flexibly modulate the
weight given to new data as evidence for such a change varies.
The computation of unexpected uncertainty is nontrivial,
because improbable data samplesmay be attributed to a change
in the statistics underlying the environment, or alternatively to the
known unreliability of predictive relationships, dubbed expected
uncertainty (Yu and Dayan, 2005). Importantly, the definition of
unexpected uncertainty does not imply that the agent is unaware
that his environment is subject to change. Instead, a data sample
with high unexpected uncertainty indicates that it is surprising
given the cue-outcome association acquired through sampling,
even when expected uncertainty, or the known, learned unreli-
ability of this association, is accounted for.
One form of expected uncertainty is risk, or the inherent
stochasticity of the environment that remains even when the
contingencies are fully known. For example, when sampling
from an environment in which reward is delivered 50% of the
time versus one in which reward is delivered 95% of the time,
risk is higher in the former case. The perceptions of risk and un-
expected uncertainty are antagonistic (Yu and Dayan, 2005) in
the sense that when risk is high, as in the former case, changes
in the environment are hard to detect and hence, unexpected
uncertainty is low, whereas when risk remains low, as in the latter
example, changes in the environment lead to strong increases
in unexpected uncertainty.
Unexpected uncertainty is also influenced by estimation
uncertainty or the imprecision of the learner’s current beliefs
about the environment (Chumbley et al., 2012; Frank et al.,
2009; Payzan-LeNestour and Bossaerts, 2011; Pre´vost et al.,
2011; Yoshida and Ishii, 2006), which is also referred to as
second-order uncertainty (Bach et al., 2011). If beliefs are ac-
quired through learning as opposed to instruction, this quantity
decreases with sampling. When estimation uncertainty is high,
improbable samples may be partially attributed to the agent’s
inaccurate beliefs about the structure of the environment, rather
than to a change in that structure.
Recent behavioral work suggests that subjects’ choices may
indeed reflect a learning scheme that makes use of unexpectedNeuron 79, 191–201, July 10, 2013 ª2013 Elsevier Inc. 191
Figure 1. Task Illustration, Behavioral
Model Comparison, and BOLD GLM Sche-
matic
(A) Illustration of task. On free choice trials partic-
ipants chose one of two cue stimuli within 2 s of
cue onset. The chosen cue probabilistically deliv-
ered an outcome of +V1, V1, or no change after
a 4 s delay. Each trial was followed by a variable
length ITI. Forced choice trials were also included,
on which only a single cue was available for play.
(B) Bayesian information criterion (BIC) values of
the benchmark RL model relative to the Bayesian
model. Each point represents a single participant,
with a point above the line indicating greater evi-
dence for the Bayesian model.
(C) Schematic of GLM used in analysis of BOLD
data; columns denote onset regressors, white
boxes denote parametric modulators.
See also Figure S1.
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saerts, 2011). In addition, recent studies tracking pupil size
dynamics (Nassar et al., 2012; Preuschoff et al., 2011) demon-
strated a correlation of unexpected uncertainty with phasic
changes in pupil diameter. Although it has been noted (Yu,
2012) that the action of the cholinergic system also influences
pupil size, this modulatory effect was attributed (Nassar et al.,
2012) to the activity of the locus coeruleus (LC), a nucleus in
dorsorostral pons whose neurons represent the sole source of
noradrenaline to the cerebral cortices, cerebellum, and hippo-
campus (Aston-Jones and Cohen, 2005; Moore and Bloom,
1979). Transient shifts in the activity of LC during contingency
changes in a target reversal task with nonhuman primates
(Aston-Jones et al., 1997) have also been noted; specifically a
transition from the phasic mode, characterized by both relatively
low baseline firing rate and high phasic responsiveness to task-
relevant stimuli, to the tonic mode, characterized by both
relatively high baseline firing rate and diminished phasic respon-
siveness to task-relevant stimuli. Finally, pharmacological acti-
vation of the noradrenergic system in rats has been found
to speed behavioral adaptation to changes in environmental
contingencies (Devauges and Sara, 1990) whereas noradren-
ergic, and not cholinergic, deafferentation of rat medial frontal
cortex has been found to impair it (McGaughy et al., 2008). These
finding are consistent with the theoretical claim that signaling
of unexpected uncertainty is mediated by the action of the
noradrenergic modulatory system (Yu and Dayan, 2005).
Despite this accumulating behavioral and psychophysical
evidence for unexpected uncertainty, to our knowledge, no study
to date has directly investigated the neural substrates of unex-
pected uncertainty in human subjects. To that end, we present
results from a study in which participants underwent functional
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) while they played a six-
armed restless bandit decision task in which the payoff probabil-
ities of the bandit arms changedwithout notice and hence, unex-192 Neuron 79, 191–201, July 10, 2013 ª2013 Elsevier Inc.pected uncertainty fluctuated constantly.
To properly distinguish between changes
in unexpected uncertainty and changes inthe probability of a jump, or volatility (Behrens et al., 2007; Bland
and Schaefer, 2012), we kept the latter constant. We applied a
model-based Bayesian learning algorithm (Payzan-LeNestour
andBossaerts, 2011) to track subjects’ estimates of the outcome
probabilities on each arm. This algorithm provides a principled
way to measure unexpected uncertainty, as well as estimation
uncertainty and risk, while specifying how they should influence
the rate of learning. Given the complex interrelations between the
different components of uncertainty, we included each of the
uncertainty signals in our fMRI analysis to minimize potential
confounds. We also controlled for changes in the learning rate,
because its strong dependence on unexpected uncertainty
would otherwise mean that neural activity superficially corre-
lating with unexpected uncertainty could merely reflect generic
changes in the learning rate.
We hypothesized that we would observe separately iden-
tifiable neural effects of unexpected uncertainty, estimation un-
certainty, and risk. We predicted that unexpected uncertainty
would be encoded at the time of outcome along with the learning
rate, as these signals are needed for the purpose of updating
values to guide choice on subsequent trials (Figure 1C). In
particular, we aimed to test for activity reflecting unexpected
uncertainty within the noradrenergic brainstem nucleus locus
coeruleus. Several studies from the neuroeconomics literature
have reported neural correlates of risk during choice in insular
cortex/IFG (d’Acremont et al., 2009;Huettel et al., 2005;Preusch-
off et al., 2008), but also anterior cingulate (Christopoulos et al.,
2009), striatum (Hsu et al., 2005), and intraparietal sulcus (Huettel
et al., 2005). Moreover, other studies have reported activation
correlating with the degree of ambiguity present in a decision-
gamble (Hsu et al., 2005) or the degree of estimation uncertainty
in a learning task (Bach et al., 2011; Behrens et al., 2007; Chumb-
ley et al., 2012; Pre´vost et al., 2011). However, such studies have
typically used discrete variations in risk and estimation uncer-
tainty, or have limited their attention to specific brain regions,
Figure 2. Unexpected Uncertainty
(A) SPM showing negative effect of unexpected
uncertainty at time of outcome at posterior
cingulate [PCG; peak at x,y,z =8,34,44]; pFWE <
0.05 after extent thresholding.
(B) Bar plot shows average effect of low, medium,
and high unexpected uncertainty at left middle
temporal gyrus. To generate this, trials were
sorted according to their unexpected uncertainty
value into one of three equal-sized bins, which
were then fitted to the BOLD signal. Error bars
represent SEM.
(C) SPM showing negative effects of unexpected
uncertainty at time of outcome at left middle
temporal gyrus [MTG; peak at x,y,z =44,78,26],
bilateral postcentral gyrus [PCG; peaks at x,y,z =
58,28,46; x,y,z = 54,24,20], left hippocampus
[Hi; peak at x,y,z = 28,36,10], posterior
cingulate [PCG; peak at x,y,z = 8,34,44], and
left posterior insula [Ins; peak at x,y,z =42,6,2];
pFWE < 0.05 after extent thresholding.
See also Figure S3 and Table S1.
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these signals in a naturalistic learning environment.
We were also interested in the role played by the limited set
of cortical regions that have been shown to project directly to
locus coeruleus in rats and nonhuman primates; those areas
being anterior cingulate cortex, dorsomedial and dorsolateral
prefrontal cortex, and orbitofrontal cortex (Arnsten and Gold-
man-Rakic, 1984; Aston-Jones et al., 2002; Jodo et al., 1998).
It has been suggested (Aston-Jones and Cohen, 2005) that
descending projections from these prefrontal regions mediate
the influence of important task-related information on the activity
of locus coeruleus.We hypothesized that estimation uncertainty,
which interacts with unexpected uncertainty to drive learning,
might be encoded in these prefrontal areas, giving it the
potential to influence the computations there. Alternatively,
unexpected uncertainty signals may be computed in these
prefrontal regions and subsequently relayed to locus coeruleus.
Given the broad distribution of our regions of interest, a whole-
brain imaging approach was used to test for regions yielding
correlations with our uncertainty signals.
RESULTS
Behavioral
Consistent with prior findings (Payzan-LeNestour and Bos-
saerts, 2011), the Bayesian learning model fit choices better
than the benchmark reinforcement learning model for the
majority (89%) of participants (Figure 1B) after the free parame-
ters of both models were optimized for each participant. A one-
tailed paired t test on the differences of the goodness-of-fits
(Bayesian information criterion [BIC]) found the fit of the Bayesian
model to be significantly better (p = 0.0012; n = 18). As a consis-
tency check, we fitted the parameters across subjects by mini-
mizing the negative log-likelihood of the choice data pooled
over all the participants. The results obtained were consistent
with those reported here.Neuroimaging
We did not observe a significant blood oxygen level-dependent
(BOLD) response at our significance threshold of pFWE < 0.05
to two of our regressors of interest, namely estimation uncer-
tainty at phasic outcome and learning rate at tonic outcome
(see Table S1, available online, for coordinates of all significant
activations).
Unexpected Uncertainty at Outcome
Tonic activity at outcome correlated significantly (pFWE < 0.05)
and negatively with unexpected uncertainty in posterior cingu-
late cortex, bilateral postcentral gyrus, left middle temporal
gyrus (MTG), left hippocampus (Hi), and left posterior insula
(Ins) (Figure 2). In separate analyses, we included unexpected
uncertainty as a modulator of (1) phasic activity at outcome
presentation and (2) the 1.5 s period while the outcome was
on-screen. The BOLD responses we found overlapped with
those illustrated in Figure 2, but were weaker and less exten-
sive (Figure S3).
In order to test for the effect of unexpected uncertainty at locus
coeruleus, we employed a preprocessing and analysis proce-
dure optimized for this location (see Experimental Procedures).
We applied a small volume correction to the results of this
analysis using an anatomical mask of human locus coeruleus
in MNI space, generated by Keren et al. (2009) from high resolu-
tion T1-weighted MR imaging of the brainstem. This mask
served the dual purpose of correcting the activations for multiple
comparisons and delineating the locus coeruleus—a nucleus
that is difficult to discriminate on standard T1-weighted images.
Following correction, we observed a significant (pFWE < 0.05,
SVC) negative response in left LC to unexpected uncertainty
(Figure 3). The activity in this cluster does not extend significantly
into surrounding pontine structures and the peak of this cluster
before masking matches that of the masked cluster at a strict
(pUNC < 0.0002) uncorrected threshold (see Figure S2 for axial
slices illustrating activation in pons).Neuron 79, 191–201, July 10, 2013 ª2013 Elsevier Inc. 193
Figure 3. Unexpected Uncertainty in Locus Coeruleus
SPM showing negative effect of unexpected uncertainty (magenta) at locus
coeruleus [LC; peak at x,y,z, = 2,37,17; pUNC < 0.001], and anatomical
ROI (blue) of locus coeruleus taken from Keren et al. (2009).
See also Figure S3 and Table S1.
Figure 4. Estimation Uncertainty
(A) SPM showing effect of estimation uncertainty at time of cue at anterior
cingulate [AC; peak at x,y,z = 0,10,54]; pFWE < 0.05 after extent thresholding.
(B) Bar plot shows the average effect of low, medium, and high estimation
uncertainty at anterior cingulate. To generate these plots, trials were sorted
according to their estimation uncertainty value into one of three equal-sized
bins, which were then fitted to the BOLD signal. Error bars represent SEM.
(C) SPMshowing effects of estimation uncertainty at time of cue at intraparietal
sulcus [IPS; peak at x,y,z = 42,40,52], bilateral middle occipital gyrus
[MOG; peak at x,y,z = 38,88,6], striatum [St; peak at x,y,z = 8,2,12], bilateral
middle frontal gyrus [MFG; peaks at x,y,z = 34,58,10; x,y,z = 52,10,38;
x,y,z = 48,36,24; x,y,z = 30,4,64], and anterior cingulate [AC; peak at x,y,z =
0,10,54]; pFWE < 0.05 after extent thresholding. Activation increased linearly in
estimation uncertainty at all regions, with the exception of a cluster at right
MFG [x,y,z = 30,4,64].
See also Table S1.
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Phasic activation correlated significantly and positively (pFWE <
0.05) with estimation uncertainty of the chosen option in intra-
parietal sulcus (IPS), bilateral middle occipital gyrus (MOG)
with activation extending bilaterally into parahippocampal
gyrus, striatum (St), bilateral middle frontal gyrus (MFG), and
anterior cingulate (AC). With the exception of a cluster at right
MFG [x,y,z = 30,4,64], activation increased linearly in estima-
tion uncertainty at all regions (Figure 4).
Areas correlating with unexpected and estimation uncertainty
are also shown overlaid on the same figure in Figure 5 in order
to illustrate more clearly the differential activation patterns asso-
ciated with each.
Risk at Cue
Phasic activation correlated significantly and positively (pFWE <
0.05) with the risk of the chosen option at cue presentation
in right inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) and bilateral lingual gyrus
(LG). These activations were found to increase linearly in risk
(Figure 6). A subsequent analysis did not find a modulation
by risk of activity in the period between cue and outcome
presentation.
Learning Rate at Outcome
The learning rate at outcome correlated significantly (pFWE <
0.05) with phasic BOLD activity in cuneus (Figure 7). We also
tested whether subjects’ BOLD activity in this cluster was a
better predictor of learning than the model-derived Bayesian
learning rate, by extracting an averaged and normalized BOLD
time course from the cuneal cluster and substituting it for the
Bayesian learning rate in our model. The goodness of fit (log-
likelihood) of this modified model was poorer than that of our
original Bayesian learning model. This remained the case when
the BOLD time course was high-pass filtered before inclusion
in the learning model and when free parameters were included
to scale and offset the BOLD time course.
Expected Value at Cue
In order to confirm that our model was also capturing neural cor-
relates of expected value as shown in many previous studies
(FitzGerald et al., 2009; Hampton et al., 2006; Plassmann et al.,
2007) we tested for areas correlating with the expected value
of the chosen option at cue presentation. Although we did not194 Neuron 79, 191–201, July 10, 2013 ª2013 Elsevier Inc.find significant effects at our whole-brain significance threshold,
for this analysis we could motivate a focused region of interest
analysis because such signals are consistently reported in the
ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC). We therefore corrected
for small volume within a sphere of radius 5 mm centered on the
average of the peak coordinates of previously reported vmPFC
activations to expected value, taken from Valentin et al. (2007).
Consistent with these prior studies, we found significant corre-
lation (pFWE < 0.05) in the vmPFC with the expected value of
the chosen option.
Outcome Value
Finally, we tested for regions encoding the value of the outcome.
While the phasic effect of outcome value was not strong enough
to survive our whole-brain significance threshold, there is a large
body of literature reporting activation of the ventral striatum in
response to appetitive and aversive outcomes (Delgado et al.,
2000, 2008; Elliott et al., 2000; O’Doherty et al., 2004). We there-
fore applied a small volume correction bilaterally at the ventral
striatum using coordinates taken from Di Martino et al. (2008)
and found significant effects (pFWE < 0.05) of outcome value at
both left and right ventral striatum.
Figure 5. Unexpected Uncertainty and Esti-
mation Uncertainty
SPMs showing effects of estimation uncertainty at
time of cue (green) and negative effect of unex-
pected uncertainty at outcome (red); pFWE < 0.05.
Neuron
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In order to account for variance attributable to prediction error
signaling (Montague et al., 1996; O’Doherty et al., 2004; Schultz
et al., 1997) we ran an additional GLM which included expected
value as a phasic modulator of activity at the time of cue onset
and prediction error, derived from a fitted delta learning rule,
as a phasic modulator at the time of outcome presentation.
Using this model, the results presented above remained sig-
nificant at our whole-brain-corrected threshold. In addition, we
ran a separate analysis testing for the presence of an unsigned
prediction error signal at the time of outcome presentation, but
did not observe a response that survived our significance
threshold.
DISCUSSION
Uncertainty is an inherent feature of real-world interactions with
the environment. While previous studies have revealed neural
correlates of uncertainty, such studies have not determined the
neural correlates of unexpected uncertainty in the brain, a metric
that may mediate rapid adaptation to changes in the environ-
ment. Here, we localized brain activation correlating with unex-
pected uncertainty, separating it from neural activity associated
with risk and estimation uncertainty. We further separated this
from activation arising from changes in the learning rate. By
including all three uncertainty signals and learning rate in one
model, we have ensured that experimental variance is appropri-
ately assigned, thereby enabling the neural substrates of each to
be identified.
We observed significant negative encoding of unexpected
uncertainty in several brain regions at the time of outcome
feedback: the posterior cingulate cortex, a region of postcentral
gyrus, a region of posterior insular cortex, left middle temporal
gyrus, and the left hippocampus. The presence of a specific
unexpected uncertainty signal in a separate network of brain
regions from that engaged by other forms of uncertainty pro-
vides direct experimental evidence in support of theoretical
claims that this specific type of uncertainty is distinct from other
forms of uncertainty such as risk and estimation uncertainty
(Payzan-LeNestour and Bossaerts, 2011; Yu and Dayan, 2005).
It is also important to note that a number of other studies have
reported engagement of one or more of these brain areas in
functions that may relate to or involve unexpected uncertainty,
although this variable was not explicitly measured in those
past studies. For instance, unexpected uncertainty arguably re-
lates to novelty detection, and the hippocampus has previously
been found to play a role in classifying observations into cate-
gories of familiarity and novelty (Rutishauser et al., 2006). A
recent experimental study of behavioral adaptation in humans(Collins and Koechlin, 2012) suggests that after a contextual
change, humans retrieve from their memory similar contexts
experienced in the past and select the behavioral strategy that
they previously learned to be optimal in that context. The unex-
pected uncertainty signaling we observe is unlikely to reflect the
deployment of such a strategy because the unsignaled changes
in our paradigm typically led to genuinely new situations.
We also observed a significant negative response to unex-
pected uncertainty in the noradrenergic brainstem nucleus locus
coeruleus. This response was localized to locus coeruleus using
an MR template (Keren et al., 2009), despite the decreased
signal-to-noise ratio in the brainstem resulting from the effects
of cardiac pulsation and respiratory movement. The response
is unlikely to be an artifact of motion attributable to increased
physiological arousal as the BOLD effect observed is decreasing
with increasing uncertainty. While previous studies have demon-
strated sensitivity of neuronal responses in locus coeruleus to
unexpected changes in reward contingencies in rats and
nonhuman primates (Aston-Jones et al., 1997; Bouret and
Sara, 2004) and have attributed phasic changes in pupil diameter
in human subjects correlating with unexpected uncertainty to the
action of locus coeruleus (Nassar et al., 2012; Preuschoff et al.,
2011), this finding represents neural evidence in humans for
the claim that brain regions containing noradrenergic neurons
are involved in the representation of unexpected uncertainty
(Yu and Dayan, 2005). The neurophysiological literature (Aston-
Jones et al., 1999; Bouret and Sara, 2005) has noted a distinction
between the phasic and tonic modes of LC activity. While the
phasic mode has been associated with enhanced task engage-
ment and performance, the tonic mode has been associated
with increased distractibility, the shifting of attention, and explor-
atory behavior (Aston-Jones and Cohen, 2005; Aston-Jones
et al., 1994; Rajkowski et al., 1992). In addition, shifts fromphasic
to tonic LC mode have been noted during contingency changes
in a target reversal task with nonhuman primates (Aston-Jones
et al., 1997). In our task, however, a contingency change may
not precipitate the shifting of attention to previously irrelevant
task stimuli or engagement in exploratory behavior, as may be
the case in a target-reversal paradigm; rather it is possible that
the contingency change signaled by high unexpected uncer-
tainty brings about increased engagement with the outcome
stimuli for the purpose of learning and thus recruitment of phasic
LCmode, characterized by both relatively low baseline firing rate
and high phasic responsiveness to task-relevant stimuli. Given
that our BOLD signal appears to be more sensitive to baseline
activity as opposed to phasic responsiveness, this effect
could potentially manifest in the sustained decrease in BOLD
signal that we observe under conditions of high unexpected
uncertainty. Further investigation is required, however, to fullyNeuron 79, 191–201, July 10, 2013 ª2013 Elsevier Inc. 195
Figure 6. Risk
(A) SPM showing effects of risk at time of cue at right inferior frontal gyrus [IFG;
peak at x,y,z = 56,16,6] and bilateral lingual gyrus [LG; peaks at x,y,z =
18,52,2; x,y,z = 26,56,16]; shown at pFWE < 0.05 after extent thresh-
olding.
(B) Bar plot shows the average effect of low, medium, and high risk at inferior
frontal gyrus. To generate this, trials were sorted according to their risk value
into one of three equal-sized bins, which were then fitted to the BOLD signal.
Error bars represent SEM.
See also Table S1.
Figure 7. Learning Rate
Effect of learning rate at time of outcome at cuneus [CUN; peak at x,y,z =
2,86,22]; pFWE < 0.05 after extent thresholding.
See also Table S1.
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and how it may influence the BOLD signal. Another key question
for future research lies in determining which, if any, of the cortical
representations of unexpected uncertainty observed here are
dependent on efferent projection from locus coeruleus. It also re-
mains to be seen whether unexpected uncertainty is computed196 Neuron 79, 191–201, July 10, 2013 ª2013 Elsevier Inc.in locus coeruleus or is projected to locus coeruleus from an up-
stream region; although it should be noted that in the current
study we do not find evidence of unexpected uncertainty
signaling in any of the prefrontal cortical regions suggested to
project directly to locus coeruleus.
Estimation uncertainty at the time of cue presentation, as
distinct from unexpected uncertainty and risk, correlated with
activity in several brain structures, most notably in the anterior
cingulate cortex, extending into posterior dorsomedial prefrontal
cortex. The area of cingulate cortex found here overlaps with
that described by Behrens et al. (2007) as correlating with
volatility (i.e., the unconditional probability of a jump), as well
as with estimation uncertainty. This may reflect the correlation
between estimation uncertainty and volatility, as both are
affected by the frequency at which the environment changes.
However, the two are conceptually distinct. In particular, one
distinctive role of estimation uncertainty is to influence the
trial-by-trial assessment of unexpected uncertainty (Payzan-
LeNestour and Bossaerts, 2011).
In addition to responses at anterior cingulate and posterior
dorsomedial prefrontal cortices, we observed encoding of esti-
mation uncertainty bilaterally in dorsolateral prefrontal cortex.
It should be noted that these regions, along with orbitofrontal
cortex, comprise the limited set of cortical regions known to
send strong direct projections to locus coeruleus in nonhuman
primates (Arnsten and Goldman-Rakic, 1984; Aston-Jones
et al., 2002; Jodo et al., 1998), although importantly, evidence
for projections from posterior dorsomedial prefrontal cortex is
weaker than that for other regions (Aston-Jones and Cohen,
2005). In the light of theoretical claims and empirical evidence
that locus coeruleus may signal unexpected uncertainty through
its noradrenergic efferents, allowing it to modulate the rate of
learning (Nassar et al., 2012; Preuschoff et al., 2011; Yu and
Dayan, 2005), our finding suggests a modulatory pathway by
which representations of estimation uncertainty may influence
unexpected uncertainty signaling. However, further research is
required to directly test this hypothesis.
The presence of an estimation uncertainty signal in parts of
the dorsomedial and dorsolateral frontal cortex is consistent
with recent proposals that the prefrontal cortex provides esti-
mation uncertainty signals that are used in directed exploration
schemes (Badre et al., 2012; Cavanagh et al., 2012; Frank
et al., 2009). In previous work (Payzan-LeNestour and Bossaerts,
Neuron
Neural Representation of Unexpected Uncertainty2012), participants tended to direct exploration toward bandit
arms with minimal level of estimation uncertainty as well as
toward arms with maximal level of unexpected uncertainty. In
the current learning task, we did not find evidence of this directed
exploration, which may be attributable to the task design; at
most only two bandit arms were available for choice on each trial
in the current task, versus six in the task of Payzan-LeNestour
and Bossaerts (2012). Thus, although the neural representations
of uncertainty we report may support such guided exploration,
we could not directly examine this in the current study.
A region of inferior parietal lobule was also found to track esti-
mation uncertainty. Such a finding relates to previous studies
that have assessed neural correlates of ambiguity during eco-
nomic decision-making (Bach et al., 2011; Huettel et al., 2006).
In those studies, subjects were provided with partial information
regarding the probabilities associated with obtaining a reward
outcome and could not improve their estimate of those probabil-
ities through sampling. In contrast, in our case, estimation uncer-
tainty reduces over trials as the number of samples of an option
increases provided there is no jump in the outcome probabilities.
Although findings of neural overlap must be treated with caution,
by showing that ambiguity and estimation uncertainty do appear
to engage at least partly overlapping regions, our finding sug-
gests that the two may engage similar underlying computational
processes.
Now turning to risk, we found significant correlations with this
variable in inferior frontal gyrus as well as a region of lingual gyrus
bilaterally. In previous studies describing neural representations
of risk, activity has also been reported in the inferior frontal gyrus
(Huettel et al., 2005) and the adjacent anterior insula (Huettel
et al., 2005; Preuschoff et al., 2008). Other studies have reported
activations in additional brain regions not found at our whole-
brain-corrected threshold, including the anterior cingulate cortex
(Christopoulos et al., 2009) and the intraparietal sulcus. Further-
more, we found activity in the lingual gyrus, an area typically not
found to correlate with risk per se, although Callan et al. (2009)
found that lingual gyrus is involved in tracking resolution of un-
certainty, and Bruguier et al. (2010) reported enhanced lingual
gyrus activation when insider trading risk increased in the
context of a financial market. One potential account for the differ-
ences in activation patterns found here is that because we are
modeling other uncertainty components at the same time and
therefore accounting for confounding variance, this confers a
greater sensitivity to uncover signals specifically pertaining to
risk on the present study, as opposed to those confounding vari-
ables. Furthermore, in many previous studies assessing risk
perception, reward probabilities were presented explicitly in a
descriptive fashion (Christopoulos et al., 2009; Huettel et al.,
2005; Preuschoff et al., 2008; also see d’Acremont et al.,
2009), while in our task, neural representations of risk are
acquired through direct sampling from a distribution of reward.
Thus, putative differences between neural systems involved in
descriptive versus experiential learning may account partially
for involvement of distinct brain areas to those found in studies
on risk representations in descriptive tasks.
Finally, we observed activity in cuneus correlating with the
learning rate. Previous studies on the neurobiological bases of
choice under uncertainty also reported cuneus activation (Huet-tel et al., 2005; Schlund and Ortu, 2010; Volz et al., 2003), but the
activation was not linked to parametric changes in the level of
uncertainty or to changes in the learning rate induced by
changes in uncertainty. One study by Haruno et al. (2004), using
an index of changes in behavior following reinforcement that
could in part reflect learning rate, found activation correlating
with cuneus activity. More generally, the cuneus has been iden-
tified in numerous studies as playing a role in visual attention
and in orienting to stimuli in the environment (Carter et al.,
1995; Corbetta, 1998; Hahn et al., 2006; Le et al., 1998; Talsma
et al., 2010). Our finding may therefore reflect the modulation of
visual attention in line with the rate of learning toward a particular
stimulus. While the present study involved the presentation
of stimuli exclusively in the visual domain, in future it would be
informative to use cue stimuli in other modalities, such as the
auditory domain, in order to ascertain whether brain systems
involved in auditory attention are involved in encoding the
learning rate.
In conclusion, the present study goes substantially beyond
previous studies on uncertainty representations by using a
model-based fMRI procedure in combination with a Bayesian
computational model to establish that each of three unique
forms of uncertainty is encoded in the brain and is associated
with unique neural substrates. More specifically, we have identi-
fied specific regions that are involved in implementing unex-
pected uncertainty in the brain, including posterior cingulate,
parietal cortex, and the hippocampus, as well as the noradren-
ergic brainstem nucleus, locus coeruleus. This provides support
for the theoretical proposal that unexpected uncertainty drives
learning in unstable reward environments. We have also
observed estimation uncertainty signals in prefrontal regions
known to project directly to locus coeruleus, suggesting a neural
pathway by which estimation uncertainty may modulate the
noradrenergic representation of unexpected uncertainty, as
required by our Bayesian learning algorithm. Our findings, there-
fore, demonstrate that the human brain has the capacity to
disentangle uncertainty into its various components, i.e., risk,
estimation uncertainty, or unexpected uncertainty. The resulting
signals affect the learning rate differentially and optimally, in line
with Bayesian learning.EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURES
Procedures
Eighteen healthy young adults (mean age = 22.5 years, SD = 2.81 years; nine
males) participated in our neuroimaging study. The imaging data from one
female subject was discarded due to distortions. All participants provided
written informed consent. The study was approved by the Research Ethics
Committee of the School of Psychology at Trinity College Dublin.
Participants were directed to watch online instructions for the task before
the experimental session (the online instructions of the task are available
at http://www.elisepayzan.com/research/experiments/research/). These
instructions told participants that they would be performing a demanding
decision task, described the task and stated that the experiment did not
involve deception. Upon arrival in the lab, participants again watched the
online instructions, after which they completed a multiple-choice question-
naire that checked their understanding of the task. Participants were also
briefed on the payment procedure, including the fact that payment would be
sensitive to task performance. Participants were told that they would complete
four sessions of the task; one training session outside the MRI scanner andNeuron 79, 191–201, July 10, 2013 ª2013 Elsevier Inc. 197
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their understanding and acceptance of these procedures. Subsequently,
participants completed the training session of the task outside the scanner,
comprising 158 trials and lasting 15 min. After a 10 min break, participants
performed the three in-scanner sessions of the task, each lasting 17 min.
On average, participants completed 188 trials during the scanning runs.
Participants received the accumulated outcomes from the four runs of the
task minus an amount that was fixed before the session, but revealed to the
subject only after the task was completed. This was intended to prevent
well-established wealth effects from occurring during the task.
Task and Stimuli
The task (see Figure 1A) was an adaptation of a restless bandit task introduced
in Payzan-LeNestour and Bossaerts (2011) and was presented using JAVA.
Arm pairs were drawn from a selection of three yellow and three blue arms
of differing shapes. On free-choice trials participants could choose between
two displayed arms. On randomly interleaved forced-choice trials, only one
arm was displayed for choice. Free choice trials comprised 95% of trials in
the training session outside the scanner and 75% of trials in the scanner.
This design was chosen to minimize potential confounding factors in our
analysis of the neuroimaging data, because it allowed us to control for activa-
tions specific to the evaluation of nonchosen alternatives. Participants had 2 s
to indicate their choice and were penalized by V1 for each late or incorrect
response. Four seconds after choice, the chosen arm probabilistically deliv-
ered a monetary gain (+V1), a monetary loss (V1), or nothing. This outcome
was displayed for 1.5 s. Participants were not informed of the outcome
probabilities of each arm. An intertrial interval with a duration drawn from a
uniform distribution with a minimum of 0.5 s and amaximum of 14.5 s followed
each trial.
The outcome probabilities of the arms jumped (changed) regularly, without
notice. Participants were informed that this would occur because previous
work (Payzan-LeNestour and Bossaerts, 2011) suggests that without pro-
viding this information, subjects do not report detecting changes in contin-
gencies. Participants were told that yellow arms had a higher jump probability
than the blue but were not told the jump probabilities, which were 1/4 and 1/16,
respectively. Participants were also informed that if the outcome probabilities
had jumped for one arm, then they had jumped for all arms of the same color.
The yellow and blue groups each contained a high, a medium, and a low risk
arm, where risk refers to the entropy of the outcome probabilities of a arm.
High-risk arms always had probability distributions with maximal entropy (1),
meaning that the probabilities of its three outcome were equal. The low-risk,
low entropy (0.5) arms had a single high probability outcome but the identity
of this outcome changed with each jump in the probabilities. The medium-
risk arm had entropy of 0.75. Participants were not told the risk levels of the
arms but were told that the arms’ risk levels were fixed across the task.
Thus, when a jump occurred, the three outcome probabilities simply permuted
within each arm.
Imaging Procedures
Magnetic resonance imaging was carried out with a Philips Achieva 3T
scanner with an eight-channel SENSE (sensitivity encoding) head coil.
T2*-weighted echo-planar volumes with BOLD contrast were acquired at a
30 angle to the anterior commissure-posterior commissure line, to attenuate
signal dropout at the orbitofrontal cortex (Deichmann et al., 2003). Thirty-nine
ascending slices were acquired in each volume, with an in-plane resolution
of 3.5 3 3.5mm and slice thickness of 3.85 mm [TR: 2,000 ms; TE: 30 ms;
FOV: 224 3 224 3 150.15 mm; matrix 64 3 64]. Data was acquired in three
sessions, each comprising 520 volumes. Whole-brain high-resolution T1-
weighted structural scans (voxel size: 0.93 0.93 0.9 mm) were also acquired
for each subject. To account for physiological fluctuations, subjects’ cardiac
and respiratory signals were recorded with a pulse oximeter and a pressure
sensor placed on the umbilical region. Due to a technical problem, cardiac
and respiratory information could not be collected from two subjects.
Behavioral Modeling
Choice was modeled using the softmax choice rule, which has been shown to
capture exploration in restless multi-armed bandits (Daw et al., 2006). As198 Neuron 79, 191–201, July 10, 2013 ª2013 Elsevier Inc.inputs, the softmax choice rule uses differences in the estimated values of
the available arms on each trial. We assume that these values are learned
with a model-based Bayesian updating scheme. The Bayesian model used
in this study is described in detail in Payzan-LeNestour and Bossaerts (2011)
and for brevity is not reproduced in full here (details of the Bayesian
learning algorithm are available at http://dx.doi.org/doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.
1001048). According to this model, the decision maker uses the structure of
our restless multiarmed bandit task to predict trial-by-trial outcomes for all op-
tions. Specifically, the decision maker adjusted the learning rate as a function
of the strength of evidence in favor of a jump in a trial (the unexpected uncer-
tainty). Our model-based Bayesian approach has the advantage of producing
an explicit learning rate, unlike alternative Bayesian procedures. It has also
been shown to fit choices well in our earlier study (Payzan-LeNestour and Bos-
saerts, 2011) where participants had access to all six arms on every trial.
In order to check the goodness of fit of our Bayesian learning scheme, we
benchmarked it against the fit of a simple reinforcement-learning (RL) model,
using a Rescorla-Wagner update rule (Rescorla and Wagner, 1972). In the
benchmark RL model, the estimated value of the chosen bandit was updated
based on the reward prediction error (difference between outcome and
predicted outcome values) and a constant learning rate. While the learning
rate remained constant for a given arm, we allowed for differences across
yellow (more volatile) and blue (less volatile) arms, in accordance with recent
evidence that humans set different learning rates depending on jump fre-
quency or volatility (Behrens et al., 2007). We also tried a learning approach
whereby the learning rate changes proportionally with the size of the reward
prediction error (Pearce and Hall, 1980) but this model performed more poorly
and was discarded.
Both the Bayesian and benchmark RL models were fitted to participants’
choices in the three runs in the scanner (141 free-choice trials) using maximum
likelihood estimation. Estimated parameters were allowed to vary across par-
ticipants. Only one parameter was needed to fit the Bayesian learning model,
namely, the exploration intensity (temperature) of the softmax choice rule. In
the case of the benchmark RL rule, two learning rates (one for each arm color
group) were estimated, as well as the exploration intensity of the softmax
choice rule. For each model we report the BIC, a model evaluation criterion
that corrects the negative log-likelihood for the number of free parameters.
fMRI Preprocessing
Image processing and analysis was performed using SPM5 (Wellcome
Department of Imaging Neuroscience, Institute of Neurology; available at
http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm). EPI images were slice-time corrected to
TR/2 and realigned to the first volume. Each participant’s T1-weighted
structural image was coregistered with their mean EPI image and normalized
to a standard T1MNI template. The EPI imageswere then normalized using the
same transformation, resampled to a voxel size of 2 mm isotropic, smoothed
with a Gaussian kernel (FWHM: 8 mm) and high-pass filtered (128 s).
In order to test for task-related BOLD signal at locus coeruleus, we adopted
a specialized preprocessing and analysis procedure designed to mitigate
difficulties arising from the size and position of locus coeruleus. Only results
reported in LC were obtained using this procedure. The conventional normal-
ization procedure in SPM5 seeks an optimal whole-brain deformation using a
limited number of degrees of freedom. However, achieving a global optimum
can come at the cost of regional accuracy, and as a consequence, BOLD
effects in small structures such as locus coeruleus may be underestimated
or misattributed to neighboring regions; particularly if extensive Gaussian blur-
ring is applied to the data. We therefore employed a two-stage normalization
procedure designed to maximize intersubject registration, which followed
the slice-timing and realignment steps described above. The first stage of
this procedure comprised a whole-brain diffeomorphic normalization of the
functional and anatomical data into MNI space using the DARTEL algorithm
(Ashburner, 2007), which is not limited by a small number of degrees of
freedom and is thus better at estimating local deformations than both conven-
tional normalization in SPM and regional weighting techniques (Yassa and
Stark, 2009). This procedure resampled the functional data to a voxel size
of 2 mm isotropic and incorporated smoothing with a 1 mm FWHM kernel.
This minimal smoothing was employed in order to avoid aliasing of data. The
second stage of the procedure was an ROI alignment (ROI-AL) (Yassa and
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Neural Representation of Unexpected UncertaintyStark, 2009) procedure using a diffeomorphic implementation (Vercauteren
et al., 2007) of Thirion’s (Thirion, 1998) demons alignment algorithm in the
MedINRIA software package (Version 1.9.0, ASCLEPIOS Research Team).
First, each subject’s brainstem was manually delineated on his/her DARTEL-
normalized anatomical scan. The ventral boundary of this ROI was set at the
last axial slice on which the nodulus of the cerebellum was visible in the fourth
ventricle, whereas the dorsal boundary was set on the most superior slice on
which the crural cistern was visible. Our brainstem ROIs were then registered
with the brainstem ROI of a single subject. The resulting registered brainstem
ROIs were then averaged in SPM5 with ImCalc to create a first model. Subse-
quently, the original brainstem ROIs were registered with this model and the
newly registered brainstem ROIs were averaged to create a second model.
We repeated these two steps three more times to generate a more accurate
model. The individual displacement fields resulting from the last iteration of
this process were then applied to each subject’s DARTEL-normalized
functional and anatomical scans. The functional data was high-pass filtered
(128 s) before entering the statistical analysis.
fMRI Statistical Analysis
We analyzed the BOLD data using a parametric GLM. This GLM included
parametric regressors constructed from trial-by-trial estimates of the learning
rate and the three uncertainty signals obtained from the Bayesian learning
model (see Figure S1 for illustrations of the temporal dynamics of these
signals). In our behavioral model, unexpected uncertainty measures the
likelihood that a jump has occurred, given the current observation. Risk was
measured as the entropy of the mean posterior outcome probabilities.
Estimation uncertainty was measured as the entropy of the posterior distribu-
tion of the outcome probabilities.
The subject-specific design matrices used in the GLM comprised four
onset regressors (see Figure 1C for a summary): a stick function at the time
of cue presentation (‘‘Phasic Cue’’) modulated by three parametric regressors
encoding the risk and estimation uncertainty of the chosen machine and the
trial type (free choice versus forced choice); a boxcar regressor extending
from the time of cue presentation to the time of outcome presentation (‘‘Tonic
Cue’’) modulated by a parametric regressor encoding the model-derived
expected value of the chosen machine; a stick function at the time of outcome
presentation (‘‘Phasic Outcome’’) modulated by four parametric regressors
encoding the value of the outcome displayed, the learning rate, the estimation
uncertainty of the chosen machine and the trial type; and a boxcar regressor
extending from the time of outcome presentation to the time of cue presenta-
tion on the following trial (‘‘Tonic Outcome’’) modulated by two parametric
regressors encoding the learning rate and the unexpected uncertainty value
of the chosenmachine. Each of our regressors was convolved with a canonical
hemodynamic response function after being entered into SPM5 to generate
a design matrix. Motion parameters estimated during the realignment proce-
dure were also included as regressors of no interest.
Task-related BOLD response in pontine structures may be attenuated by
periodic physiologic noise arising from respiratory motion and cardiac pulsa-
tility. In our analysis of LC activity, we therefore included 13 additional regres-
sors of no interest in our GLM to account for physiological fluctuations (four
related to heart rate, nine related to respiration) which were estimated using
the retrospective image correction (RETROICOR) method (Glover et al.,
2000) with data recorded during the fMRI sequences.
In order to test for a BOLD response specific to unexpected and estimation
uncertainty at outcome presentation, we orthogonalized these uncertainty
regressors with respect to the learning rate regressor, with which they may
be correlated. Thus the learning rate regressor captured all of the common
variance between learning rate and the uncertainty signals, thereby ensuring
that any variance loading on the uncertainty regressors could not be ac-
counted for as reflecting an effect of learning rate per se. It should be noted
that there is a functional relationship between the current level of unexpected
uncertainty and the change of the learning rate—rather than the current level of
the learning rate. This change in learning rate is a deterministic function of the
estimated level of unexpected uncertainty, and updates of the latter depend on
the level of risk and of estimation uncertainty.
Maps of the voxel-wise parameter estimates for the parametric regressors
indicate how the BOLD activity scales with the computational signals. Thesesubject-level linear contrasts were used in a between-subjects random effects
analysis testing the effect of each regressor across the group. Each partici-
pant’s model fit (log-likelihood) value was adjusted for the number of choice
trials they completed and included as a covariate of no interest. Unless other-
wise stated, we report statistics from whole-brain analyses corrected for
multiple comparisons to pFWE < 0.05, with a cluster spatial extent threshold
of 186 voxels. This threshold was calculated using a Monte Carlo simulation
of activation assuming the null hypothesis, implemented using 3DFWHMX
and AlphaSim (AFNI) (Cox, 1996). In our analysis of LC activity we used an
anatomical mask of human locus coeruleus in MNI space created by Keren
et al. (2009) to verify that BOLD effects fall within the space of the LC.
For each of the areas where activation was found to covary significantly
with a computational signal, we further analyzed whether the BOLD signal
increased linearly in the computational signal. We reasoned that only a linear
effect of an uncertainty measure on the BOLD signal would be evidence that
the area encodes the uncertainty measure and therefore plotted the average
BOLD estimates (corrected for the effect of other regressors) across subjects
on trials in which the uncertainty metric was low, medium, or high (Figures 2, 4,
and 6). These plots were generated using the rfxplot toolbox for SPM5
(Gla¨scher, 2009). To avoid bias because of reuse of the same data, we used
a leave-one-out cross-validation procedure: the group-level random effects
model was re-estimated 17 times, omitting a different subject each time. For
each subject, the trials were sorted into one of three bins (bins defined at
33rd, 66th, and 100th percentile) according to the value of the uncertainty
signal. We extracted BOLD signals at the coordinates of the local maximum
on the group-level from which the subject was omitted that were nearest to
the coordinates of the full-group maximum. The plots illustrate the average
parameter estimates across subjects.
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